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Food Federalism: States, Local Governments, and 
the Fight for Food Sovereignty 
SARAH SCHINDLER 
Recently, a number of states have sought to withdraw or restrain local 
power. In this Article, which is part of the “Re-Thinking State 
Relevance” symposium hosted by the Ohio State Law Journal, I write 
about a state taking the opposite approach, and attempting to 
affirmatively endow its local governments with additional powers. The 
state is Maine, and the context is control over local food production and 
sales. This Article begins by addressing the emergence of the 
sustainable local foods movement broadly, and reasons for the growth 
of this movement. It then focuses more pointedly on the food sovereignty 
movement, considering the ways that this movement has sought to put 
control into the hands of local people, and thus local governments. This 
Article then considers the power struggles between state and local 
governments, and the reason that even strong local governments might 
not be able to act as forcefully as they would like in areas such as food 
regulation. Finally, this Article addresses Maine’s passage of a state 
law recognizing local food sovereignty, and the federalism concerns 
that this law raised. This Article seeks to present a roadmap for states 
that wish to play a more active role in advancing local food goals, or 
empowering local governments more broadly. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When I ask my first-year students what they know about environmental 
regulation, they often mention the famous federal environmental statutes—the 
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. While 
these classic federal statutes make up the bulk of a traditional environmental law 
curriculum, many scholars have expanded their conception of environmental 
law.1 This expanded view includes actions taken at the state and local levels, as 
well as topics outside the traditional canon.2  
The topic of this symposium is “Re-Thinking State Relevance.” While a 
number of scholars focus their work on the interplay between state and federal 
governments when it comes to environmental law, my research focuses 
primarily on local governments and the ways they can aid in advancing 
environmentalist agendas and fighting climate change.3 
Local governments have been working toward environmental goals on a 
number of fronts, especially through climate change mitigation and adaptation.4 
But in this Article, I want to address a topic that would likely be considered 
outside the traditional canon, but one that constitutes a growing and important 
part of environmental law: local and regional food systems.5 More specifically, 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See generally Jason J. Czarnezki & Sarah Schindler, President Trump, the New 
Chicago School, & the Future of Environmental Law and Scholarship, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP: ESSAYS ON PURPOSE, SHAPE AND DIRECTION (Ole 
Windahl Pederson ed., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 196) (on file with author) 
(describing the expanding nature of what scholars consider to fall within the category of 
“environmental law”). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See generally Sarah Schindler, The Future of Abandoned Big Box Stores: Legal 
Solutions to the Legacies of Poor Planning Decisions, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 471 (2012) 
(discussing how local governments have an economic incentive to repurpose big box stores 
and proposing four alternative uses: retail reuse, adaptive reuse, demolition and 
redevelopment, and demolition and regreening); Sarah Schindler, Unpermitted Urban 
Agriculture: Transgressive Actions, Changing Norms, and the Local Food Movement, 2014 
WIS. L. REV. 369 (2014) [hereinafter Schindler, Unpermitted] (discussing illegal local food 
actions as a catalyst for change); Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED: Municipal 
Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285 (2010) (discussing 
private rule creation). 
 4 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Zoning, Transportation, and Climate Change, 8 ZONING L. 
& PRAC. REP. 1, 2 (2007); Emma L. Tompkins & Hallie Eakin, Managing Private and Public 
Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 3, 4 (2012); Katrina Fischer 
Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors that Harm the 
Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1132–33 (2012). 
 5 A number of environmental law scholars have been writing about food systems and 
food law in recent years, to the extent that a co-author and I have suggested that it is now 
part of an expanded definition of environmental law. See Czarnezki & Schindler, supra note 
1 (manuscript at 196–97); see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Regional Foodsheds: 
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a number of local governments have been adopting what are known as “food 
sovereignty” ordinances with a variety of goals, including improving their 
ability to produce and consume locally grown food.6  
This Article will begin in Part II by addressing the emergence of the 
sustainable local foods movement and reasons for its growth. That part will 
specifically address how local food systems can advance environmental goals. 
Part III will turn to a focused discussion of the food sovereignty movement. It 
considers the way this movement seeks to put control in the hands of local 
people, and thus local governments, while Part IV addresses the motivations 
behind the adoption of local food sovereignty ordinances. Part V turns to the 
power struggles between state and local governments, and the reason that even 
strong local governments might not be able to act as forcefully as they would 
like in areas such as food regulation. In discussing the relationship between state 
and local governments, and the fact that local governments often lack power to 
take bold actions to advance environmental goals, this Part will suggest that this 
leaves a lot of room for states to step in and take actions to encourage and 
empower local governments. Part VI presents an example of a state doing just 
that: it addresses Maine’s passage of a State law recognizing local food 
sovereignty and the federalism issues that this law raised. This Article concludes 
by addressing the way that states can play a more active role in advancing local 
food goals.  
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL FOODS AND 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 
This Article is part of the symposium panel dealing with environmental law. 
Thus, it begins by addressing the ways in which local foods are related to 
environmental law, environmentalism, and environmental goals. 
The local foods movement has gained much traction and public visibility in 
recent years.7 There are a number of reasons for the rise in interest in local foods, 
including “deeply held philosophical concerns about corporate influence over 
                                                                                                                     
Are Our Local Zoning and Land Use Regulations Healthy?, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 
599, 600 (2011). 
 6 See Alexis Baden-Mayer & Katherine Paul, Can Food Sovereignty Laws Protect 
Local Farms from Annihilation?, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N (Sept. 11, 2013), 
https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/can-food-sovereignty-laws-protect-local-farms-
annihilation [https://perma.cc/T6U8-2RX2]; see also Town of Montville, Me., Montville  
Local Food Security Resolution (2011), available at https://www.sourcewatch.org/images 
/3/33/Montville_Local_Food_Resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW28-JTAJ] (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2018); Letter from Neil Coonerty & Ellen Pirie to Bd. of Supervisors, Cty. of Santa 
Cruz (Sept. 6, 2011), https://foodfreedom.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/santa-cruz-right-to-
grow-resolutn.pdf [https://perma.cc/R35Q-E2ZQ].  
 7 See Oran B. Hesterman & Daniel Horan, The Demand for ‘Local’ Food Is Growing—
Here’s Why Investors Should Pay Attention, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 25, 2007), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-demand-for-local-food-is-growing-2017-4 
[https://perma.cc/R2GQ-KMFV]. 
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the U.S. food supply and the environmental ramifications of our current 
centralized food system structure, to a simple preference for food varieties that 
have been bred for flavor rather than tolerance for long-distance shipping.”8 
Indeed, much of the discussion surrounding the increased interest in local foods 
connects the idea to more sustainable agricultural practices, and a desire to move 
away from industrial agricultural production and the harms associated with it.9 
As I have written about previously, those harms fall into two broad categories: 
harm to the public health and harm to the environment.10 
A. Public Health Concerns Associated with Industrial Agriculture 
Industrial agricultural practices are tied to a number of public health 
concerns, including food insecurity, food deserts, and diet-related disease, all of 
which could also be thought of as environmental justice issues.11 First, food 
insecurity is the idea that many people do not have access to sufficient amounts 
of affordable, healthy foods to feed their families.12 Scholars have argued that 
food insecurity is tied to large-scale industrial food production due to factors 
such as reliance on oil products and the need for food to be imported from far-
flung production locations.13  
                                                                                                                     
 8 Debra Tropp & Malini Ram Moraghan, Local Food Demand in the U.S.: Evolution 
of the Marketplace and Future Potential, in HARVESTING OPPORTUNITY: THE POWER OF 
REGIONAL FOOD SYSTEM INVESTMENTS TO TRANSFORM COMMUNITIES 15, 27 (Andrew 
Dumont et al. eds., 2017). 
 9 Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that there is a large 
monoculture-based industrial agriculture scale farm down the street from your house! 
However, most of the literature discussing local foods defines it as “alternative and 
oppositional” to industrial food systems. See Robert Feagan, The Place of Food: Mapping 
Out the ‘Local’ in Local Food Systems, 31 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 23, 24 (2007) 
(comparing “local food systems” movements, including alternative agro-food networks, 
community food security, civic agriculture, post-productivism, shortened food chains, and 
the “quality turn”). 
 10 Sarah B. Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens and Front Yard Gardens: The Conflict 
Between Local Governments and Locavores, 87 TUL. L. REV. 231, 262–68 (2012) 
[hereinafter Schindler, Backyard] (discussing public health harms including food insecurity, 
food deserts, and obesity—and environmental harms—including the oil-intensive nature of 
industrial agriculture, monocropping, and animal welfare). 
 11 Id.  
 12 DARRIN NORDAHL, PUBLIC PRODUCE: THE NEW URBAN AGRICULTURE xiii (2009) 
(“Until communities figure out how to provide for themselves, instead of relying on a 
handful of petrophilic agribusinesses in remote locations in our country and abroad, our 
satiety will be tenuous.”); see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TRADE 
REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY: CONCEPTUALIZING THE LINKAGES 29 (2003) (defining food 
security as the state where “all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life”). 
 13 Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 234; ANNIE SHATTUCK & ERIC HOLT-
GIMÉNEZ, WHY THE LUGAR-CASEY GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY ACT WILL FAIL TO CURB HUNGER 
1, 3 (2009); AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND 
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Industrial agriculture might also be related to food deserts: areas that lack 
access to fresh, healthy foods and places that sell them.14 This is in part because 
the zoning that is required for agricultural operations means that in many parts 
of the country farms are not close to urban areas, so there is a lack of proximity 
to produce.15 Wealthier areas often have markets and grocery stores that have 
sufficient demand to ship in produce, but this is not necessarily the case in all 
communities.16 Thus, if small-scale or urban farming were permitted closer to 
or within communities that are currently food deserts, the problems of proximity 
and distribution could be alleviated.17  
Diet-related diseases, such as diabetes and heart disease, are another public 
health concern that has been linked to the consumption of industrially-produced, 
processed foods.18 In contrast to all of this, local foods can help to foster and 
build social capital, a sense of community and identity, and provide avenues for 
people to meet their neighbors, or to share food that they have grown 
themselves.19 This type of “civic agriculture” can help improve public health 
within a community.20 
                                                                                                                     
DEPRIVATION 7 (1981) (noting that hunger is not just related to insufficient amounts of food, 
but the systems for food distribution as well). But see Jane Black, What’s in a Number? How 
the Press Got the Idea that Food Travels 1,500 Miles from Farm to Plate, SLATE (Sept. 17,  
2008), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2008/09/whats_in_a_number.html  
[https://perma.cc/5QP4-ELAQ] (arguing that the famous “1,500 miles” statistic is flawed).  
 14 Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 266.  
 15 See id.  
 16 See id. at 267.  
 17 See JACOB E. GERSEN ET AL., Nutrition, in FOOD LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 639, 
666, 690–91 (2015) (describing food deserts). But see Deborah N. Archer & Tamara C. 
Belinfanti, We Built It and They Did Not Come: Using New Governance Theory in the Fight 
for Food Justice in Low-Income Communities of Color, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 307, 311 
(2016) (suggesting “incorrect assumptions about the barriers to accessing healthy foods”). 
See generally SEN, supra note 13 (discussing the way that causes of hunger and malnutrition 
are related to poverty and food distribution issues). 
 18 See generally JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF CAPITALISM (2011) (analyzing how capitalism contributes to obesity and arguing 
that local, organic food can help solve the problem). 
 19 Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 281–82; Schindler, Unpermitted, supra note 
3, at 371–72. But see Margot Pollans & Michael Roberts, Setting the Table for Urban 
Agriculture, 46 URB. LAW. 199, 224 (2014) (discussing potential benefits of urban 
agriculture and arguing that it is not inherently beneficial). 
 20 See, e.g., Margot J. Pollans, Farming and Eating, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 99, 100–01 
(2017) (noting that one cost of the industrial food system is an obscuring of the shared 
interests between food producers and food consumers); Laura Saldivar-Tanaka & Marianne 
E. Krasny, Culturing Community Development, Neighborhood Open Space, and Civic 
Agriculture: The Case of Latino Community Gardens in New York City, 21 AGRIC. & HUM. 
VALUES 399 (2004) (discussing the role that community gardens play in community 
development and civic agriculture).  
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B. Environmental Health Concerns Associated with Industrial 
Agriculture 
Even more relevant for purposes of this Article is that there are a number of 
harms to the environment that have been linked to industrial agricultural 
systems.21 First, industrial agriculture is oil intensive, which contributes to 
greenhouse gas emissions.22 Further, factory farms, where most animals that are 
killed for food live,23 are associated with a host of environmental harms, 
including runoff that pollutes our waterways, and of course, harm to the animals 
themselves.24 Finally, industrial farming is reliant upon monocultures.25 It 
typically focuses on large-scale production of a single crop, which results in 
land that is over-cultivated and topsoil that is not protected.26  
Some of these harms can be alleviated, at least incrementally, as people find 
ways to opt out of the industrial food system. This could involve the 
development of alternative distribution networks or alternative mechanisms of 
production. But it could also involve a move toward local food production and 
consumption, where people grow and raise their own food, or have access to 
food that is grown within their communities.27  
Indeed, one of the strongest arguments that ties local food to environmental 
goals is that local food systems can help improve resiliency, which is an 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See, e.g., Margot Pollans, Food Systems, in CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND 
THE LAW (Justin Gundlach & Michael Burger eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 31) 
(on file with author) (“Modern agricultural systems generate significant environmental 
degradation.”). 
 22 Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural 
Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 600 (2010) 
(discussing animal waste with respect to Concentrated Animal Feed Operations (“CAFOs,” 
also known as factory farms)).  
 23 CAFOs “produce ‘more than 99 percent of all farmed animals raised and slaughtered 
in the United States.’” Elizabeth Ann Overcash, Unwarranted Discrepancies in the 
Advancement of Animal Law: The Growing Disparity in Protection Between Companion 
Animals and Agricultural Animals, 90 N.C. L. REV. 837, 861 (2012) (quoting Ending 
Factory Farming, FARM FORWARD), http://www.farmforward.com/farming-forward/factory 
-farming (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
 24 Margot J. Pollans, Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural Exceptionalism, 77 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1195, 1208 (2016); Angelo, supra note 22, at 607. 
 25 Industrial Agriculture: The Outdated, Unsustainable System that Dominates U.S. 
Food Production, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/our-
work/food-agriculture/our-failing-food-system/industrial-agriculture#.W5aWCJNKgU0 
[https://perma.cc/69EE-DGLA].  
 26 Angelo, supra note 22, at 606.  
 27 Schindler, Unpermitted, supra note 3, at 372 (noting that some of these harms might 
be partially alleviated as more people have access to local food); see also Mia Shirley, Food 
Ordinances: Encouraging Eating Local, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 511, 518 
(2013) (“Increased reliance on local, sustainable food sources can help reduce the 
environmental damage caused by the current U.S. food production system.”). 
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important topic in recent environmental literature.28 Resilience means the 
“capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize” while still retaining 
its same basic function.29 The idea is that if there are a number of local or 
regional food systems in place, people will be less reliant on production from a 
single geographic area, or of a single monoculture crop.30 Thus, in the event of 
a large-scale climate-related catastrophe, natural disaster, or chemical attack, it 
is likely that in some areas the availability and affordability of food would be 
impacted.31 But, to the extent that many localities and regions have their own 
substantial food production and distribution systems in place, it is likely that 
food production in many other parts of the country would be unaffected. Thus, 
producers could work on distributing from those areas with robust local systems 
to the areas that were targeted by the disaster.  
Given all of this, it is clear that there are a number of environmental benefits 
to moving away from large scale industrialized food systems and toward more 
localized ones. Because of this, and for other reasons as well, which will be 
addressed below, a number of local governments have begun to take steps 
toward strengthening their own local food systems.32 One way that localities 
have attempted this is through the adoption of food sovereignty ordinances.33 
III. FOOD SOVEREIGNTY 
The term food sovereignty has international origins tied to a global peasant 
farmers’ social movement.34 In this original context, it was defined as “the right 
of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and [farmers’] right to define their 
own food and agriculture systems.”35 The central idea is that food sovereignty 
                                                                                                                     
 28 See, e.g., Schindler, Backyard, supra note 10, at 276. 
 29 Brian Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social–
Ecological Systems, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 5, 6 (2004). 
 30 See id. 
 31 Pollans, supra note 21 (manuscript at 1) (suggesting that “[c]limate change may 
increase food-related public health concerns by damaging food production, undermining 
food quality, and impeding food access”). 
 32 See infra notes 34–36. 
 33 See Blue Hill, Me., Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of 2011 
(Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://farmtoconsumer.org/news_wp/wp-content/uploads 
/2013/05/BlueHill_LocalFoodOrd_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SAZ-FJAA]. 
 34 See Madeleine Fairbairn, Framing Transformation: The Counter-Hegemonic 
Potential of Food Sovereignty in the US Context, 29 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 217, 217 (2012) 
(describing the origins of food sovereignty tied to La Vía Campesina). See generally Hilda 
E. Kurtz, Framing Multiple Food Sovereignties: Comparing the Nyéléni Declaration and 
the Local Food and Self-Governance Ordinance in Maine, in FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 163 (Amy Trauger ed., 2015) (discussing Maine’s “Ordinance 
language with an eye to how particular clauses enact and/or adapt rights claims found in the 
2007 Nyéléni Declaration of Food Sovereignty”).  
 35 Declaration of Nyéléni, NYELENI.ORG (Feb. 27, 2007), http://nyeleni.org/spip.php? 
article290 [https://perma.cc/M38Z-EGHU]. 
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gives control over the way that food is produced, sold, and eaten within local 
communities to those local communities.36 However, as the concept of food 
sovereignty has made its way to the United States, the term has taken on a bit of 
a libertarian bent, which I will further explain below; in this country, food 
sovereignty seems to manifest as a desire to avoid regulations that currently 
govern food production.37 
In the U.S., food sovereignty ordinances have originated in local 
communities.38 Maine, where I live, was one of the first states where a number 
of local towns adopted these ordinances.39 The goal of the ordinances is to 
declare towns as “food sovereign,” meaning that the town’s own rules should 
govern with respect to food that is grown, raised, or produced, and sold for 
consumption within that town.40  
These new food sovereignty designations are related to, but distinct from, 
other state and local attempts to limit the application of certain food safety laws 
to small-scale producers. For example, a number of communities have enacted 
“cottage food laws.”41 These laws tend to exempt home kitchens from certain 
regulations, or to allow certain products made in a home kitchen and sold locally 
and directly to consumers to be exempt from regulation.42 In contrast to these 
cottage food laws, which focus on exemption of certain types of products, or 
products made in certain ways, food sovereignty ordinances have a bolder and 
more wide-ranging aim: they seek to declare their local right to regulate food, 
and perhaps even a right to food itself.43 
In order to understand what local food sovereignty ordinances are trying to 
do, it is important to first have a basic understanding of the current regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
 36 See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, The Law and Political Economy of Contemporary Food: 
Some Reflections on the Local and the Small, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 131 (2015) 
(“[A] core principle of food sovereignty . . . [is] that small producers and consumers should 
make democratic decisions about food provisioning in particular social and geographical 
spaces.”). 
 37 See, e.g., Stephen R. Miller, A Coordinated Approach to Food Safety and Land Use 
Law at the Urban Fringe, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. ETHICS 422, 435 (2015). 
 38 See Julia Bayly, Food Sovereignty Continues to Pick up Steam Around the State, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 10, 2018), http://bangordailynews.com/2018/03/10/homestead 
/food-sovereignty-continues-to-pick-up-steam-around-the-state/ [https://perma.cc/Q7NW-
AA5L]. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. But see Kurtz, supra note 34, at 165–67 (noting that some scholars have 
challenged the emphasis on localism in the U.S. food sovereignty movement). 
 41 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 37, at 431–32 (describing cottage food laws); see also 
Dan Flynn, More Food Producers Exempt from FSMA Under Tester-Hagen, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/04/more-food-producers-
exempt-from-fsma-under-tester-hagen/#.WtX1yNPwbVo [https://perma.cc/S8CV-MEFY] 
(discussing Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) Tester-Hagan Amendment, which 
exempts small scale producers engaged in marketing). 
 42 Miller, supra note 37, at 432 (noting that cottage food laws often exempt from 
regulation foods that are “not potentially hazardous”). 
 43 See Blue Hill, supra note 33.  
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scheme that governs agriculture, food production, and food safety in the U.S. 
The key for purposes of this Article is that our current food system is heavily 
controlled by federal agencies and regulations. The FDA controls most food 
safety and labeling issues, though the USDA also has jurisdiction over meat and 
poultry.44 Further, states adopt their own regulations pursuant to and in 
compliance with those federal regulations. States must ensure that any state and 
local requirements are at least as strict as the federal rules.45 A big reason for 
this regulation is to protect the public health; food-borne illness is a real concern 
and sickens many people every year (although, I would note, the numbers are 
small in comparison to diet-related diseases).46 
In recent years, a small number of towns (and states) have begun to adopt 
statutes and ordinances addressing issues that could at least tangentially be tied 
to food sovereignty, or that relate to issues of who has control over the 
production and consumption of food.47 The goal of these towns is effectively to 
declare themselves exempt from existing state and federal licensing and 
inspection procedures. 
IV. WHY FOOD SOVEREIGNTY?: MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE ORDINANCES 
The motivations behind these U.S. food sovereignty ordinances are 
multifaceted. First, the ordinances are partially about democratic self-
governance and self-determination.48 Indeed, many of the ordinances adopted 
                                                                                                                     
 44 Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2012); Poultry Products 
Inspection Act (PPIA), 21 U.S.C. § 454 (2012). 
 45 Under an at least equal to cooperative agreement with the USDA Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS), States may operate their own Meat and Poultry Inspection 
programs if they meet and enforce requirements “at least equal to” those imposed under the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act, Poultry Products Inspection Act and Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act of 1978. Letter from Alfred V. Almanza, Acting Deputy Under Sec’y, Office 
of Food Safety, Adm’r, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., to Walter E. Whitcomb, Comm’r, 
Me. Dep’t of Agric., Conservation & Forestry (July 6, 2017), [hereinafter Letter from 
Almanza] https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/inspection/state-inspection- 
programs/state-inspection-and-cooperative-agreements [https://perma.cc/P37L-WH7Y]; see 
also FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 661(b); PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 454(b).  
 46 See Emily Broad Leib & Margot J. Pollans, The New Food Safety, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author) (arguing that the U.S. 
overregulates when it comes to food safety); see also BAYLEN LINNEKIN, BITING THE HAND 
THAT FEEDS US 26 (2016) (arguing against new FDA regulations with small marginal 
benefits). 
 47 See, e.g., Pollans, supra note 21 (manuscript at 21) (noting that food sovereignty is 
concerned with “how and by whom food is produced”). 
 48 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 36, at 118 (“food sovereignty evokes populist and early 
social-era agrarian arguments about economic self-governance as its own political good”). 
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in Maine use language about “assert[ing] our right to self-government” and 
recognizing “the authority to protect that right as belonging to the Town.”49 
These ordinances are also often about food choice, which many view as 
political, akin to a form of free speech or other fundamental right.50 Indeed, food 
choice advocates have buoyed the idea of food sovereignty.51 For example, “in 
challenging the FDA’s mandate that milk sold in interstate commerce be 
pasteurized,” the Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund suggested “that milk 
consumers have been deprived of fundamental privacy rights—including the 
right to protect one’s own bodily health.”52 
There is also a sense that many involved with this local fight for “food 
sovereignty” would simply prefer that the government stay out of the way.53 
This idea ties into debates founded in civil-libertarianism, and arguments 
regarding local government overreach, the “nanny state,” and public health 
paternalism.54 Some local food activists believe that people should be able to 
engage in one-on-one exchanges with local farmers without governmental 
oversight or involvement.55  
This libertarian-style argument also relates to another purpose of these 
ordinances, which is to further the ability of local residents to conduct business 
without unduly burdensome interference. Often, these attempts at food 
sovereignty are in response to feelings that people want to be able to cook and 
sell small amounts of food locally without going through expensive and time-
consuming permitting and licensing processes.56 Indeed, the origin of the food 
sovereignty discussion in Maine is often tied to small-scale chicken farmers in 
                                                                                                                     
 49 See, e.g., Blue Hill, supra note 33; see also Appleton, Me., Town of Appleton Local 
Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance (June 13, 2012), available at 
http://appleton.maine.gov/vertical/sites/%7B5CBE9B20-93F0-4ECA-B07C-188D88398A3 
1%7D/uploads/Food_Ordinance_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYP8-9TU6] (relying on right 
of self-governance). 
 50 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 737, 746 (2013).  
 51 See id.  
 52 Id. at 743. 
 53 At least one commentator has suggested that many local attempts at food sovereignty 
are in fact more accurately described as “anti-regulat[ory].” See Allison Condra, Food 
Sovereignty in the United States: Supporting Local and Regional Food Systems, 8 J. FOOD 
L. & POL’Y 281, 296 (2012) [hereinafter Condra, Food Sovereignty] (“[M]ovements that may 
look like food sovereignty at first glance . . . that increased protection for locally made 
products and would have criminalized federal regulation of said local products, is less of a 
food sovereignty statement and more of an anti-regulation statement.”). “Food sovereignty 
envisions a role for government in ensuring food safety and in developing its own food and 
agriculture system. In these local food ordinances, it is easy to assume, based on the language 
of the ordinance, that the goal is de- or no regulation of the food system at the level of 
producer direct to consumer transactions.” Id. at 308. 
 54 Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up 
Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE, 16, 29 (2015). 
 55 See generally Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53 (discussing the local food 
sovereignty movement). 
 56 See Schindler, supra note 54, at 30. 
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the state who “were faced with costs of more than $20,000 to build on-site 
slaughter facilities . . . or with hauling live chickens to one of just five USDA 
certified facilities in [the] 35,000 square mile state.”57 The goal of some food 
sovereignty advocates would be to allow backyard or on-farm slaughter and 
direct-to-consumer sale thereafter.58 
Food sovereignty is also concerned with food safety, though perhaps in a 
way that is different from what our current food safety regulations focus upon. 
As it was originally formulated, food sovereignty involved demands that would 
“control pests and disease, protect against environmental pollution, prohibit the 
use of antibiotics and hormones in aquacultures, and ban irradiation of food.”59 
Thus, the focus is on some of the food safety-related concerns that are 
specifically associated with larger scale, industrial agricultural productions, but 
which are typically less problematic in the context of small-scale food 
production.60 
A final motivation for food sovereignty ordinances relates to the issue of 
scale.61 Although many local farmers have small-scale operations, most of our 
federal and state food-related regulations were designed to govern and check 
abuses by large-scale food producers.62 Here, I believe that it is useful to 
reference the “matching principle,” which suggests that the size of government 
should not be larger than the size of the geographic area of the problem it is 
trying to solve.63 Effectively, this means that we should match the level of 
government to the scope of the problem. Thus, because a concern like climate 
change is a global problem, we would ideally address it through international 
governmental coordination. In contrast, one could argue, the types of food local 
                                                                                                                     
 57 Kurtz, supra note 34, at 170. 
 58 See Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 303–04. 
 59 Alli Condra, Balancing the Scales: Food “Sovereignty” and Food Safety, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/12/balancing-the-
scales-food-sovereignty-and-food-safety/ [https://perma.cc/2TQT-K5GA]. 
 60 See generally Leib & Pollans, supra note 46 (discussing inherent risks associated 
with industrialization and the fact that U.S. approaches to food safety often ignore that risk); 
Margot J. Pollans, Food Fascism (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Ohio State Law 
Journal) (arguing that there is a dichotomy between food safety law, which seeks safety via 
sterilization and homogenization, and food sovereignty laws, which seek safety via 
transparency and control). 
 61 See Alli Condra, Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinances, AGRIC. 
MGT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chi., Ill.), Aug. 2012, at 16, 17 (“[O]ne of the 
ultimate goals of the [food sovereignty] movement is to create scale-appropriate regulations 
of agriculture.”). 
 62 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (detailing the 
existing regulatory system and related mismatches in scale, along with possible reforms); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 130, 131 (2005) (analyzing jurisdictional mismatch in contemporary 
environmental law).  
 63 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: 
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
23, 25 (1996). 
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people can grow, sell, and eat within their community should be governed at the 
local level.64 Michael Pollan expressed this argument in a popular New York 
Times piece, stating:  
Today the revival of local food economies is being hobbled by a tangle of 
regulations originally designed to check abuses by the very largest food 
producers. Farmers should be able to smoke a ham and sell it to their neighbors 
without making a huge investment in federally approved facilities. Food-safety 
regulations must be made sensitive to scale and marketplace, so that a small 
producer selling direct off the farm or at a farmers’ market is not regulated as 
onerously as a multinational food manufacturer. This is not because local food 
won’t ever have food-safety problems—it will—only that its problems will be 
less catastrophic and easier to manage because local food is inherently more 
traceable and accountable.65  
Thus, there are clearly a large number of reasons that towns might want to 
adopt a food sovereignty ordinance, but legally, do they have a right to do so? 
The rest of this Article will address that question. 
V. THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Because this symposium addresses the role of states, the following Part 
provides an example of a state’s involvement in promoting local food 
sovereignty. However, in order to understand this dynamic, I will first briefly 
lay out some of the debate and discussion surrounding the relationship and 
interaction between state and local governments, as that relationship plays an 
outsized role in the attempts at food sovereignty.66 Further, in order to 
                                                                                                                     
 64 Of course, food safety concerns and the prevention of food-borne illness relate to 
public health broadly, which is a national concern, not just a local one. See Federal Meat 
Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2012); Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), 21 
U.S.C. § 454 (2012). But see MARY CHRISTINA WOOD ET AL., REFORM OF LOCAL LAND USE 
LAWS TO ALLOW MICROLIVESTOCK ON URBAN HOMESTEADS 9 (Univ. of Or. Envtl. & Nat. 
Res. Law Program Sustainable Land Use Project, 2010) (“[D]isease outbreaks in locally 
produced food systems are more isolated and therefore more contained.”). 
 65 Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.ny 
times.com/2008/10/12/magazine/12policy-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc 
/BD8M-STA9] (“Perhaps the single greatest impediment to the return of livestock to the land 
and the revival of local, grass-based meat production is the disappearance of regional 
slaughter facilities. The big meat processors have been buying up local abattoirs only to close 
them down as they consolidate, and the U.S.D.A. does little to support the ones that 
remain.”). 
 66 See Miller, supra note 37, at 434; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The 
Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1230–52 (1999).  
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understand the relationship between state and local governments, one must first 
understand the power of local governments themselves.67  
The Black letter rule with respect to local government power comes from a 
case called Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, which is that, at base, local 
governments are powerless.68 They exist at the complete whim of the state, and 
they are thus a creature of and an agent of the state.69 That said, a number of 
commentators and courts have found there to be an independent value of 
“localism.”70 This view is often tied to Toqueville’s observations in Democracy 
in America.71 He believed that in order to be effective, local governments must 
have both independence and power.72 Although he recognized that this might 
result in a more inefficient system of government, he believed in the value of 
this type of strong local government.73 Toqueville felt that this sort of model 
would encourage political participation, through which people could learn to be 
democratic citizens; and it would prevent despotism by uniting otherwise 
individualistic Americans.74 
In addition to this theoretical value in localism, or perhaps in part because 
of it, some states began granting “home rule” power to some of their 
municipalities.75 There are a few ways that this can manifest, but generally it 
                                                                                                                     
 67 This Article examines a system that involves the interplay between two tiers of 
delegation: federal-state and state-local. Although this is not a topic that has been heavily 
written about in the legal literature, this Article builds upon some foundational work 
addressing federalism and localism. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 66, at 1201 (“[E]xplor[ing] 
one aspect of this intrastate competition—the extent to which federal law can delegate 
federal powers to specific state or local institutions even against the will of the state 
legislature.”); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in 
an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 964–79 (2007) (addressing direct relations 
between federal and local governments); see also Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 
U.C. HASTINGS RES. PAPER NO. 258 (manuscript at 10–14) (on file with author) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071907 [https://perma.cc/BE57-B6AM] (addressing state-local 
delegations); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 21–33 (2010) (discussing federalism in the context not just of states, but cities and 
special purpose institutions); Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and 
Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994) 
(noting that values of federalism may be better served by localities rather than states). 
 68 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907). 
 69 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1, 8 (7th ed. 2008).  
 70 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 67, at 961 (addressing direct relations between federal 
and local governments). 
 71 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 61 (Lynn Hunt et al. eds., 
Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings trans., Bedford/St. Martins 2009) (1835). 
 72 Id. at 57. 
 73 Id. at 57. 
 74 Id. at 57–58. 
 75 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I–The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (“The home rule movement had two goals: to undo Dillon’s 
Rule by giving localities broad lawmaking authority and to provide local governments 
freedom from state interference in areas of local concern.”).  
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means that the local government has the power to regulate purely local areas of 
law.76 These are areas that do not need to be handled uniformly and that will not 
result in significant external effects on other communities.77 In some 
jurisdictions, if a local ordinance governs a purely local issue, the local 
government’s rule can trump a state rule on the same topic.78 In other home rule 
jurisdictions, the locality can only act if the state has not.79 If the state decides 
to speak on an issue, and the state and local rules are in conflict, the state will 
win.80 This is especially true if the local ordinance is less restrictive than the 
state standards.81 Of course, there are often questions about whether something 
is a purely local issue, or if there are local and state rules on similar topics, 
whether they are in conflict or can co-exist. 
As Stephen Miller noted, “[t]he food sovereignty movement is clearly 
structured to pit established principles of federalism and supremacy against 
local government’s home rule powers.”82 Indeed, it is only if the local 
government’s home rule powers control that a locality could declare itself 
exempt from state food regulations,83 which is a goal of many food sovereignty 
activists.84 However, the actions of local governments are often limited; as 
Professor Paul Diller recently noted, “the frequent preemption of city authority 
by Congress and especially state legislatures prohibits local governments from 
layering or reducing additional regulation when they see fit.”85 This is the 
classic problem that local government scholars and lawyers struggle with when 
trying to support local action.  
Recently, there have been many examples of state legislatures seeking to 
remove power from local governments by taking preventative action to prohibit 
localities from enacting certain regulations.86 These state actions sometimes 
manifest as express attempts to limit or remove home rule powers from 
localities.87 For example, the Texas legislature enacted a law that would prevent 
                                                                                                                     
 76 Id. at 10–11. 
 77 Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage 
Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1049–50 (2017). 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 1048. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Miller, supra note 37, at 434. 
 83 Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 309–10. 
 84 See Rich Hewitt, Farmers Seek to Protect Locally Grown Foods, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://bangordailynews.com/2011/02/24/news/hancock/farmers- 
seek-to-protect-locally-grown-foods [https://perma.cc/UX46-RWGY]. But see Condra, 
Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 299 (“Food sovereignty envisions a continued and 
central role of government in pursuit of its goals.”).  
 85 Diller, supra note 77, at 1048. 
 86 See Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local 
Policy Innovation, 47 J. FEDERALISM 403, 404 (2017).  
 87 Id. at 405.  
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its municipalities from banning fracking,88 and more recently other states have 
proposed the imposition of fines on local legislators, or their removal from 
office, if they attempt to adopt ordinances that govern certain subjects.89 This 
trend toward removing power from municipalities would not bode well for food 
sovereignty ordinances.90 However, at least one state has been actively working 
in opposition to this trend in the food sovereignty area. The following Part 
discusses that example. 
VI. THE STATE OF MAINE AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY 
Maine has been described as a state whose local food systems and values 
are “deeply embedded in long-standing social and political norms.”91 Perhaps 
this is part of the reason that the state presents a unique and compelling recent 
example of a state’s response to local food sovereignty ordinances.  
In June 2011, the Maine state legislature passed a resolution stating, “the 
basis of human sustenance rests on the ability of all people to save seed and 
grow, process, consume and exchange food and farm products.”92 The 
resolution provided that the state would “oppose any federal statute, law or 
regulation that attempts to threaten our basic human right to save seed and grow, 
process, consume and exchange food and farm products within the State of 
Maine.”93 This was, in part, a response to concerns of Maine farmers who 
wanted to slaughter and process poultry in the open air on their farms, and who 
wanted to sell raw milk.94  
                                                                                                                     
 88 See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West 2015) (“The authority of a 
municipality or other political subdivision to regulate an oil and gas operation is expressly 
preempted.”). 
 89 Douglas Hanks & Elizabeth Koh, Florida Mayors Can Be Fined $5,000 if They Enact 
Stricter Local Rules on Gun Control, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article200997094.html 
[https://perma.cc/F2DH-HLWC]; see also Emily Badger, Blue Cities Want to Make Their 
Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them., N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/07/06/upshot/blue-cities-want-to-make-their-own-rules-red-states-wont-let-
them.html [https://perma.cc/TF8R-BKXC]. 
 90 It is important to note, however, that state preemption is perhaps more common when 
local legislators are seeking to enact additional, or affirmative, regulation. Food sovereignty 
ordinances could be viewed as a form of deregulation, and thus perhaps they are not as 
threatening to some states. See, e.g., Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 303–04 
(discussing the libertarian characteristics of local food sovereignty ordinances); Pollans, 
supra note 60 (contrasting food sovereignty with food freedom). 
 91 Kurtz, supra note 34, at 170. 
 92 H.R.J. Res. 1176, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Condra, Food Sovereignty, supra note 53, at 303–04 (describing motivations behind 
Maine’s food sovereignty movement). 
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These same concerns had also led a number of localities in the state to begin 
adopting food sovereignty ordinances.95 These ordinances resemble one 
another, and were often based off of a model ordinance. An example reads,  
We, the People of the Town of Sedgwick, Hancock County, Maine, have the 
right to produce, process, sell, purchase and consume local foods thus 
promoting self-reliance, the preservation of family farms, and local food 
traditions. We recognize that family farms, sustainable agricultural practices, 
and food processing by individuals, families and non-corporate entities offers 
stability to our rural way of life by enhancing the economic, environmental and 
social wealth of our community. As such, our right to a local food system 
requires us to assert our inherent right to self-government. We recognize the 
authority to protect that right as belonging to the Town of Sedgwick.96  
When towns began adopting these food sovereignty ordinances, it was hard 
not to assume, from a legal perspective, that they would have no effect. Knowing 
what we know about federalism and preemption, legal scholars assumed that 
there was no merit in or point to these ordinances.97 The ordinances could, of 
course, serve a powerful narrative function, with towns asserting their interest 
in self-governance,98 but from a practical perspective, it seemed like a matter of 
time before the state or federal government would step in to put an end to the 
ordinances and any actions that resulted from them. Despite this legal 
perspective, many farmers took these local declarations of food sovereignty 
seriously, and began taking sovereign actions in response to them.99 
Acting as if the food sovereignty ordinances were controlling led to at least 
one lawsuit. A Maine raw milk producer—Farmer Dan Brown—wound up in 
court.100 The state of Maine (along with about twenty-four other states)101 
allows the sale of raw milk within the state, but it requires the farmers producing 
the milk to comply with state licensing and inspection procedures.102 Some 
                                                                                                                     
 95 Hewitt, supra note 84. 
 96 Sedgwick, Me., Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance (Mar. 5, 
2011). 
 97 Briffault, supra note 67, at 1335–44; See Ryan Almy, State v. Brown: A Test for 
Local Food Ordinances, 65:2 ME. L. REV. 790, 795 (2013). 
 98 Even if ordinances are preempted, they may serve other functions, including showing 
an expression of dissent or dissatisfaction with the status quo. Austin Raynor, The New State 
Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND. L.J. 613, 635 (2015) (“Even many preempted statutes, 
however—such as those that declare federal law void—remain capable of fulfilling a similar 
expressive function.”). They can also function as catalysts for lawsuits. Id. at 638. 
 99 See, e.g., Kevin Miller, State Sues Blue Hill Farmer for Selling Unpasteurized Milk 
at Farmers’ Markets, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011), https://bangordailynews.com 
/2011/11/16/news/hancock/blue-hill-farmer-cited-for-violating-state-law/ [https://perma.cc 
/6P28-FGDD]. 
 100 Id. 
 101 CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SALE OF RAW MILK AND OUTBREAKS 
LINKED TO RAW MILK, BY STATE (2015). 
 102 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, ch. 8-F §§ 2902-A–2902-B (2000). 
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farmers, including Farmer Brown, viewed the local food sovereignty ordinances 
in their towns as sufficient to exempt them from those state requirements.103 
Brown’s case went to court.  
As was aforementioned, many commentators and lawyers assumed that the 
court would find that the state licensing and inspection laws preempted the local 
food sovereignty ordinance.104 Indeed, that was the holding at the Superior 
Court level.105 However, on appeal, in 2014, Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court 
used statutory construction to avoid the question and decided the farmer’s case 
on other grounds.106 Thus, the question about whether existing state law 
preempted these local ordinances remained. 
As was addressed briefly above, many localities feel constrained by the 
threat of state or federal overrule,107 and thus do not act as boldly as they 
otherwise might. In Maine, however, the localities did not let this concern stop 
them from passing their food sovereignty ordinances. And interestingly, instead 
of taking action to block those localities, the state Legislature decided to take 
action in an attempt to further the goals of these towns. 
In late 2017, the Maine State Legislature decided that it wanted to take 
action to affirmatively support these food-sovereign towns, and farmers like 
Farmer Brown. Although in prior years, bills along these lines had been 
proposed, they never became law.108 This year was different. The state 
legislature adopted a law—An Act To Recognize Local Control Regarding Food 
Systems—acknowledging that municipalities may, pursuant to their home rule 
powers, adopt food sovereignty ordinances, and that the state would recognize 
and observe these ordinances.109 In doing so, the state adopted findings that 
local control of food systems would help ensure the preservation of small family 
farms, improve food security, promote self-reliance, enhance rural economic 
development, and enhance the environmental wealth of rural communities.110  
This seems like a useful way that states can ensure their localities have the 
authority and power to act in furtherance of environmental goals, such as 
supporting local food systems. As I mentioned above, without such express 
authorization, even cities with home rule power are sometimes barred from 
                                                                                                                     
 103 Miller, supra note 99. 
 104 See Almy, supra note 97, at 805. 
 105 State v. Brown, 95 A.3d 82, 91–92 (Me. 2014). 
 106 Id. at 91 (holding that the municipal ordinance would be construed to avoid a 
preemption issue and that civil penalties could be imposed on the farmer for each act that 
constituted a violation of state licensing and labeling laws). 
 107 Diller, supra note 77, at 1049 (“With the threat of state legislative, congressional, 
and presidential override . . . local governments are highly constrained in how they can 
implement their residents’ preferred policies.”). 
 108 See e.g., Kent Miller, Maine Senate Rejects Proposed ‘Right to Food’  
Constitutional Amendment, PRESS HERALD (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.pressherald.com/ 
2016/03/23/maine-senate-votes-down-proposed-right-to-food-constitutional-amendment/ 
[https://perma.cc/HAZ3-HLKE]. 
 109 Maine Food Sovereignty Act, ME. STAT. tit. 7, ch. 8-F § 283 (2017). 
 110 Id.  
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acting in areas that are already heavily regulated. However, if the state gives 
express authorization to a locality to regulate in a certain area, as the state of 
Maine did here, that lessens concerns about preemption or about the locality 
acting beyond the scope of its home rule authority. 
Despite the novelty of the state’s action here, there are a few concerns that 
must be addressed. First, there is still a pressing normative question about food 
safety, and whether it makes sense for localities to exempt themselves from state 
regulations. Further, perhaps the biggest problem is this: the state is not the final 
arbiter in the area of food safety and regulation. As was discussed earlier, there 
is a massive federal regulatory system, overseen by the USDA and FDA, with 
respect to food production. 
This soon became apparent. A few weeks before the new law was set to take 
effect, the Governor of Maine received a letter from the USDA threatening to 
transfer control of meat and poultry from the state to federal inspectors, in light 
of the new state law.111 The USDA did not believe that the state could ensure 
that state and local requirements would be at least as strict as the federal rules 
given that the state was basically agreeing to turn over control of food 
inspections and regulation to localities in some circumstances.112 Although it is 
quite possible that the federal government would have lacked the capacity to 
follow through on its threat, the Governor and Legislature did not seem willing 
to take that risk.113 Thus, the state legislature called an emergency session and 
amended its new law,114 substantially weakening it by expressly stating that the 
state would: (a) continue to require state inspection and licensing (pursuant to 
federal law) for meat and poultry (which obviously means removing a lot of 
local discretion from the food sovereign towns);115 and (b) limit local control 
                                                                                                                     
 111 Letter from Almanza, supra note 45; see also Food Sovereignty in Maine: Maine’s 
2017 Food Sovereignty Law Does Not Impact Farmers’ Markets, ME. FED’N FARMERS’ 
MKTS., http://www.mainefarmersmarkets.org/food-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/5VTK-
9A94] (last visited Apr. 24, 2018); Mary Pols, Food Law Leaves Maine Meat Producers 
Squealing for a Fix, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.pressherald. 
com/2017/10/18/maines-meat-and-poultry-producers-caught-in-the-middle-of-food-
sovereignty-fight/ [https://perma.cc/3BVW-Z4R6]. 
 112 Letter from Almanza, supra note 45. 
 113 There is a real possibility that some states might seek to achieve a goal through under-
enforcement, assuming a lack of capacity to enforce federal law. See Eric Yoder, 
Understaffing, Lack of Training at Agencies Hampering Agency Services to Public,  
Personnel Agency Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/powerpost/wp/2018/02/08/understaffing-lack-of-training-at-agencies-hampering-
agency-services-to-public-personnel-agency-says/?utm_term=.8834cdf38558 
[https://perma.cc/YB65-QCS7]. 
 114 S.J. Res. 605, 128th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2017). 
 115 Maine Food Sovereignty Act, ME. STAT. tit. 7, ch. 8-F § 285 (2017) 
(“Notwithstanding any provision in this chapter to the contrary, the department shall 
implement and enforce all provisions of Title 22, chapter 562-A and the rules adopted 
thereunder that are necessary to ensure that the requirements of the State’s meat and poultry 
products inspection and licensing program are at least equal to the applicable requirements 
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over other products to situations that involve face to face interactions at the site 
where the food was produced (thus, the law does not cover transactions at, for 
example, farmer’s markets).116 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The bottom line is that there is work for states to do here, to enable and aid 
their localities in taking forward-looking steps toward improving the 
environment; however, they must be sure to remember that they are still subject 
to a number of federal provisions. It is somewhat surprising that the State of 
Maine failed to consider these issues before adopting its state statute. That said, 
there are certain areas where states have substantial control—in the food 
context, for example, states have more control over eggs and dairy than they do 
over meat and poultry.117 Thus, in these areas of state control, states have more 
flexibility to expressly defer to local decision-making. Doing so removes 
questions about whether home rule power alone is strong enough to empower 
local governments, and gives local governments more confidence in their ability 
to take bold actions toward protecting the environment. 
Further, to the extent more states join with Maine in passing laws such as 
these, it could serve a democratic function, signaling to the federal government 
that this is what its citizens want.118 This could, perhaps, result in certain federal 
carve-outs, or a rethinking of the scale of regulation that is necessary and 
appropriate in the context of food safety and food systems.  
For now, in food sovereign towns in Maine, a consumer can purchase 
directly from a farmer products like milk, cheese, pickles, and other canned 
foods that have not undergone any state inspection or licensing. This is all done 
with the state’s explicit approval. Even a fix as small as this should enable more 
                                                                                                                     
specified under applicable federal acts, as defined by the United States Department of 
Agriculture or other federal agencies, without exception.”). 
 116 Id. at § 282(1) (defining “direct producer-to-consumer transactions” as that phrase is 
used in the law); id. at § 286 (“An individual who grows, produces, processes or prepares 
food or food products for purposes other than direct producer-to-consumer transactions in a 
municipality that adopts or amends an ordinance pursuant to [this new law] shall grow, 
produce, process or prepare the food or food products in compliance with all applicable state 
and federal food safety laws, rules and regulations.”); see also id. at § 283. 
 117 Note that farmers with fewer than 1,000 chickens have reduced federal compliance 
requirements. See LYNN BLIVEN ET AL., NEW YORK STATE ON-FARM POULTRY SLAUGHTER 
GUIDELINES: FOOD SAFETY AND BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR FARMERS PROCESSING 
LESS THAN 1000 BIRDS/YEAR (2012), http://smallfarms.cornell.edu/resources/guides/on-
farm-poultry-slaughter-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/LV9B-W8S9]. 
 118 Wyoming passed a similar Food Freedom Act. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-49-101 to -
103 (2018). Colorado has also adopted a law. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1614 (2016). 
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small farmers, who could not afford to comply with state oversight and 
regulations, to produce and distribute local foods to their neighbors.119  
                                                                                                                     
 119 Further, if someone gets sick, perhaps the existence of strict liability tort, combined 
with the ease of being able to trace the source of the illness, will negate the need for grander 
and more comprehensive food safety regulations. 
